Does Decentralized Welfare Reform Lead to a Race to the Bottom in Local Economic Development and Local Public Services? by Baryeh, Afia & Kraybill, David S.
DOES DECENTRALIZED WELFARE REFORM LEAD TO A RACE 
 
 TO THE BOTTOM IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
 











Afia Baryeh and David Kraybill Does Decentralized Welfare Reform Lead to a Race to the Bottom in Local 
Economic Development and Local Public Services? 
 
Afia Baryeh and David Kraybill 
Ohio State University 
 
I  Introduction 
This is an era of localization of economic growth and redistribution policies in the United 
States.  In 1996, Congress passed welfare reform legislation that gave the states authority 
over many aspects of welfare programs that had previously been designed and 
administered at the federal level.  Fifteen of the states have carried welfare program 
decentralization to the county level, giving county governments authority to administer 
and even decide some aspects of welfare policy at that level
1.  
 
Over the past decade, many local governments have created or expanded economic 
development departments or have increased the funds they provide to non-governmental 
or quasi-governmental economic development organizations. It is evident that policies on 
economic growth and redistribution are now set to an unprecedented extent at the local 
level. It is   therefore imperative for us to identify the distribution of these policies and to 
determine whether localities with large number of welfare recipients engage in economic 
development policies that differ from policies of localities with relatively few welfare 
recipients. With the welfare reform act welfare recipients are required to work and are 
allowed a limited number of time to be on welfare
2. This has implications for economic 
development that need to be addressed or examined. This work requirement places extra 
pressure on local governments to create new jobs for the welfare recipients to go to as 
they strive to leave the welfare benefit system.  
The literature on local economic development hypothesizes that this desire of local 
governments to create jobs for their residents may lead to certain local economic 
development choices that may not necessarily be beneficial to the society or community 
in the long run. 
 
The disparities between localities in the administration of local development activities 
results in the different counties or state governments implementing certain policies that 
would help them get ahead of their neighbors. These policies, however, lead to regressive 
development strategies that decrease the level of economic d evelopment and reduce the 
provision of local services. The literature on local economic development indicates that 
states, as small open economies, are in competition with each other.  According to Oates 
and Schwab (1991), there is no doubt that states and local jurisdictions actively compete 
against each other for jobs, investment, and other assets that promote economic growth.  
It is argued that each state looks at the welfare level and development programs in 
neighboring states before setting their economic development plans. Although 
competition is agreed to occur by most economists the effects of competition on 
economic development is still a controversial subject. Whiles some authors state that 
interjurisdictional competition leads to increased efficiency, others view competition as 
detrimental to economic development. Irrespective of the views on competition, it is 
evident certain that competition influences the levels and types of development activities 
that occur in counties and states.  
 The term “economic development” is usually used to refer to an increase in area 
employment, income or both. It could also be regarded in general as an increase in 
economic well being of area residents and is manifested by positive changes in the level 
and distribution of area employment and per capita income (Wolman and Spitzley, 1996).  
By local development in the study refers to sub-state levels. 
 
This paper theorizes that decentralization of local economic development activities and 
welfare reform leads to localities choosing non-optimal levels of economic development.  
The localities may then not have the resources needed to implement certain development 
activities.  Consequently, these activities and public services are under-provided.    We 
test the hypothesis that devolution of welfare programs leads to heightened 
intergovernmental competition and a “race to the bottom” in the provision of local public 
services.  The results of the study should be of interest to Congress, federal agencies, 
state legislatures, and policy research organizations and citizens groups focused on 
welfare and rural affairs.   
 
In section II of this paper we discuss the theoretical background of the study. Section III 
gives information on the sample and the data used. In section IV we outline the model 
used in the analysis of the problem. In section V, results are presented, and the final 
section summarizes the findings of the study.  
 
II  Theoretical Background 
 
Blakely (1994), and Shaffer and Summers (1989) define community development as 
purposeful action to create or maintain local business activity and employment. Local governments have economic development as part of their portfolio of services provided 
to the community. To achieve economic development, government officials or policy 
makers often offer tax incentives to new businesses so that they will locate in their 
respective regions.  In some cases, tax incentives designed to provide to capital and or 
labor to induce investment and to enhance employment opportunities are targeted at 
depressed urban or rural areas (Papke, 1994). The most common tax incentives include 
exemptions from or reduction of local property taxes, tax increment financing and 
income tax credit for employers hiring residents from within the region. Others may 
include low cost loans, free land or land write-downs, utility rate reduction, infrastructure 
improvement financing amongst others. 
 
The literature shows that many local jurisdictions engage in strategic behavior to better 
position their county or local area to attract outside business. The public finance literature 
going back to a 1957 paper by Stigler argues that when capital is mobile between 
jurisdictions, redistribution of income cannot readily be financed at the local level.  Local 
governments, which receive much of their revenue from taxes on industrial and 
commercial properties, compete for footloose business capital. Localities that raise taxes 
for redistribution may become less competitive as compared to localities that do not 
redistribute.  More recent writings, particularly those of Wildasin and Brueckner, suggest 
that strategic interaction among local governments competing for mobile capital may lead 
to a Nash equilibrium in which each government sets its economic development activities 
in response t o policies in competing localities.  While studies by Brueckner and Saavedra 
hypothesize that localities set a lower than optimal welfare benefit level to avoid attracting welfare dependents, our study focuses on strategic interaction in economic 
development activities.  Local governments often give tax incentives to attract firms.  Tax 
abatements reduce the “bit” of taxes that, in many localities, fund schools, transit, and 
other services that are redistributive in nature.  The widespread use of tax abatements to 
attract capital underscores the truth of Stigler’s maxim: redistribution is difficult to fund 
at the local level when capital is mobile.  The competitive behavior of local governments 
seeking to attract mobile capital may lead to under-provision of public goods and services 
compared to what citizen-taxpayers would be willing to provide, and may lead to a “race 
to the bottom,” in which localities that already provide few or poor quality local public 
services of a redistributive nature cut back even f urther on these services in an effort to 
keep taxes.  Currently, very little is known about how local administration of welfare-to-
work programs affects the level and quality of local public services, especially education, 
housing, and public safety. There is the need for researchers to study these issues. 
 
 
III  Data and sample 
 
A race to the bottom in the provision of redistributive services could occur at various 
levels of local government (county, municipal, township, or borough).  This paper 
focuses on county governments, which are particularly important in rural areas in many 
states, providing public services that cannot be provided in a cost-effective manner by 
lower levels of government in sparsely populated regions.  The study is based on a 
national survey of all county governments in 46 states. Survey questionnaires were sent 
county governments and appropriate persons (key informants) at the county level were 
asked to fill out the survey.  Data were gathered on economic development programs, local p ublic services, and welfare programs provided by county governments.  A total of 
1166 counties were used in the regressions. 
 
 
Additional data from the Census of Population (US Bureau of the Census, 1996) and 
secondary data from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) are also used in 
the study. 
 
IV  Methodological and model Specification 
 
The study uses an econometric model to test for a race to the bottom in local economic 
development at the county level in the US. We regress the number of economic 
development activities in the counties on various socio-economic characteristics of the 
jurisdiction and the level of economic development in the counties. Linear least squares 
estimation is used in this study as a preliminary step.  Ultimately, in the n ext phase of the 
research, a spatial model that allows for interaction among counties will be used.   
 
We estimate a linear regression model of county governments where the behaviors under 
examination are the number and type of economic development policies.  The level of 
economic development is used as the dependent variable in the model estimation. 
Explanatory variables include characteristics of the local economy, poverty levels in the 
county, whether there is competitive bidding between counties to attract businesses, 
existence of an industrial park, percentage of budget used to attract outside businesses, 
the share of manufacturing in total employment, and a zero-one variable indicating 
whether the county is located in a state that has devolved welfare  reform to the county level.  Some of the county characteristics include existence of property tax, location of 
county (either metropolitan or non metropolitan), amongst others. 
 
We theorize that counties in which welfare has been devolved to the county level are 
more likely to engage in regressive economic development policies in an attempt to 
attract more businesses.  The aggressiveness of neighboring counties or jurisdictions 
influences local officials decisions on levels of economic development and provision of 
public services. We therefore contend that there are spatial implications of devolution on 
local development policies. Since local officials are often most aware of the economic 
development practices of neighboring governments, we anticipate that s trategic 
interaction is a spatial phenomenon.  In the next phase of our research, we will test for the 
presence of a spatial lag and spatial autocorrelation, drawing on recent developments in 
spatial econometrics. 
 
Some of the variables in our linear regression model are similar to those used by Clarke 
and Gaile (1992) and Saavedra (2000).  Because some states have devolved welfare 
programs to the county level while other states have retained program control at the state 
level, we have a “natural control group” for testing the hypothesis that county-level 
devolution of welfare-to-work programs leads local officials to engage in more 
aggressive economic development policies than they would otherwise engage in.  In 
particular, we hypothesize that county governments in states with county-administered 
welfare-to-work programs engage in greater use of tax abatements than county 
governments in states where welfare is administered by the state government.    
The success of welfare reform depends heavily on whether o r not employment grows in 
localities with large welfare populations.  But if the lessening of central control over 
welfare programs leads to aggressive tax competition among local governments, local tax 
revenues to fund local social services may decline and the poor in some localities may be 
worse off.  In an era of decentralized programs, it is important to examine whether the 
uncoordinated efforts of local governments may lead to self-defeating outcomes. 
  
V  Results and Analysis  
The results of the study are given below. The coefficients of the variables all show the 
expected (correct) signs.  The R -squared and adjusted R -squared are 45 and 44 percent.  
F-statistics of the regression show that the results obtained are significant at 1% levels.  
The regression output of the results is shown in the appendix. 
 
The regression analysis tests hypotheses about whether decentralization of welfare reform 
leads to a race to the bottom in the level of economic development and local public 
services provided in a county. We consider counties with higher numbers of economic 
development activities to be more aggressive in their development policies and more 
likely to be engaged in a race to the bottom where the economic well-being of the poor  
worsens. 
 
All the estimated  variables are significant at the 1% levels except the share of 
manufacture in total employment, which is significant at the 10% level, and poverty levels, which is significant at the 5% level. The level of economic development activity 
in a county is significantly affected by whether the county is in a devolved state or not. 
Our result support our hypothesis that counties in devolved state are more likely to 
engage in aggressive economic development activities in an attempt to get ahead of  
competing neighbor counties. 
  
The number of economic development strategies used by a county depends on whether it 
is in a metropolitan or non-metropolitan area. Our results show the metropolitan status of 
a county to be a significant (p < 0.01) determinant of the number of economic 
development activities in which county governments engage. The more metropolitan a 
county, the less likely it is to engage in numerous development activities to achieve 
economic development.  In general, non-metropolitan areas have fewer market 
opportunities for employment creation and income expansion, and it is perhaps for this 
reason that they are more likely to utilize multiple economic development instruments.   
 
The results also show that the percentage of a county's budget that is used t o attract 
outside business is highly significant at the 1% level.  Higher budgets for attraction 
purposes makes it possible for county governments to engage in more competitive 
economic development activities.   
 
The regression analyses show that mere existence of competitive economic development 
bidding in a region leads to higher usage of aggressive development strategies. This 
variable is significant at the 1% level.  When there is competitive bidding for outside businesses each county government will strive to use more attractive incentive packages 
so that the mobile capital moves into their region. 
  
In our regression, we wanted to find out the effect of a property tax in a county on the 
number of economic development activities used by the local government. We therefore 
added a dummy variable to indicate whether a county has property tax or not. We find 
that the existence of a property tax is significant.  Taxes in general a small but 
nevertheless important cost of doing business.  Since property taxes  in some states and 
localities are lower than in others, property tax reduction is a key objective of the tax 
abatements offered by many local governments.   
 
The existence of a new or expanded industrial park in the county is also significant.  
Counties with industrial parks are likely to use incentives to get investors to locate there 
so that the industrial parks do not stay idle.  Counties with new industrial parks and those 
seeking to expand existing ones will therefore use a higher number of economic 
development activities or firm specific strategies to get new firms and capital into the 
county. 
 
The presence of an economic development official on the county government staff 
proved to be significant as well.  Such personnel help typically initiate and implement the 
economic development incentives that a county government may offer to attract new 
business. 
 Poverty level and the share of manufacturing in total employment are significant at the 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Communities with high levels of poverty use are more 
likely to use aggressive economic development policies.  Similarly counties with higher 
share of manufacturing in the total labor force are more likely to use aggressive policies, 
as compared to counties where manufacturing is less prominent.  
 
VI  Conclusion  
In this study we use a linear regression model to test whether devolution of welfare 
reform to the county levels leads local governments to set regressive economic 
development strategies thus resulting in a race to the bottom.  County governments in 46 
states were surveyed and the survey data were used for the analysis.  Secondary data are 
used to supplement the primary data from the survey. 
 
We conclude that the number of economic development activities in the counties sampled 
is positively related to the poverty rate, percent of employment from manufacturing, 
existence of a property tax, and percentage of budget used to attract outside businesses 
and competitive bidding. All the above are significant at the 1% level except the l evel of 
poverty and the manufacturing percentage of total employment which are significant at 
the 5% and 10% levels respectively. The implication of the results is that these factors 
lead to the increased usage of aggressive economic development policies.   The selection 
of aggressive economic development policies by counties with the created poverty rate 
could lead to a race to the bottom, though such a conclusion cannot be drawn without 
further testing.  
There could very well be spatial implication in the  setting of local development policies 
in counties especially if local government official in one county consider the economic 
development strategies of nearby counties before setting theirs.  In subsequent research, 
we will test for the presence of spatial effects on the levels of welfare set and the 
provision of local public services.  The effect of decentralization on the quality of local 
public services like education, housing, health care and public safety also needs further 
investigation. Notes 
 
1. States that have devolved welfare reform to the local levels include: AL, CA,    
CO, GA, MD, MI, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, SC, TN, and WI. 
 
2. Welfare recipients are given limited time on welfare (two years without work activity 
and a maximum of five years throughout an individual's whole lifetime) and are also 
required to work to be eligible for benefits. 








































Dependent Variable: ECONDEV 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 05/15/01   Time: 18:58 
Sample: 1 1166 
Included observations: 1166 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.  
DEVOL  0.427197  0.131200 3.256071  0.0012 
METRO  0.656788  0.142956 4.594335  0.0000 
IND_PARK  0.980517  0.163695 5.989913  0.0000 
EPD_PARK  0.924000  0.164671 5.611206  0.0000 
DEVSTAFF  1.407181  0.143212 9.825893  0.0000 
NEWFIRMS  0.011358  0.003133 3.625779  0.0003 
COMP_BID  1.515495  0.142108 10.66439  0.0000 
PROP_TAX  0.712973  0.165340 4.312152  0.0000 
POVERTY  0.015918  0.006903 2.306029  0.0213 
MANU  0.789285  0.443484 1.779738  0.0754 
R-squared  0.448052     Mean dependent var  3.292453 
Adjusted R-squared  0.443755     S.D. dependent var  2.768814 
S.E. of regression  2.065033     Akaike info criterion  4.296709 
Sum squared resid  4929.600     Schwarz criterion  4.340116 





- Econdev is the number of economic development activities in the county. 
- Devol is whether the county is in a devolved state. 
- Metro is a variable for whether the county is in a metropolitan area or non-metropolitan 
area. 
- Ind_park is a variable that shows whether the county has a new industrial park. 
- Epd_park is a variable that show if the county has expanded an existing industrial park.  
- Devstaff show if the county has an economic development professional on staff. 
- Newfirms is a variable the percentage of the budget that is used to attract outside 
businesses. 
- Comp_bid shows whether a county engages in competitive bidding with other localities 
in the state to attract outside businesses. 
- Prop_tax is a variable that shows whether property tax exists in a county. 
- Poverty is a variable that shows the percentage of county population in poverty. 
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